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Foreword 
As we go to press, it is still not clear if the UK will 
be exiting the EU on 31 October. An extension has 
been requested but will it be granted?  Will the 
deal that has been negotiated and the related 
Withdrawal Agreement Bill be approved by 
parliament and, if so, when? What we do know is 
that profound change is coming and businesses 
will need to respond. However, many of the levers 
of change lie with businesses and planning for 
Brexit can be a catalyst to make these changes.
Faced with uncertainty on the terms on which we 
may leave, it has been encouraging to see more 
businesses are prepared for change. However, 
some are still adopting a wait and see strategy. As 
time ticks on and the uncertainty continues, these 
judgement calls ought to be re-visited to avoid 
being left with insufficient time to act.
Businesses need to consider the issues that are 
most likely to affect their sector and then identify 
actions of no-regret, those steps that divert as 
little resource as possible, and potentially add 
value to the business whatever direction Brexit 
heads.  Three key questions would be; (i) Supply 
chains – are your suppliers ready?; (ii) People – 
have you communicated with all your staff and 
do you know how you will move staff in/out of 
the country after we leave?; and (iii) Legal and 
Regulation – can you continue to trade in the 
same way or must you change?  These – and 
many other questions - should be considered in 
advance and there is a wealth of information to 
help business assess what they need to do.  We 
should also not lose sight of the fact that with or 
without a deal, this is just the start of a process 
to agree our long-term relationship with the EU 
and at this time there is no agreed destination.  
Concluding a UK/EU free trade agreement by 
31 December 2020 (or even by 2022) will be 
challenging based on historical precedents.
With all the focus on Brexit, there has been little 
chance for discussion on the wider structural 
challenges facing the Scottish economy, such 
as our aging population, stagnating productivity 
growth and the potential impact of automation. 
For our long-term benefit, we do need to try to look 
past Brexit. One exception that has undeniably 
captured public attention is climate change. The 
subject is now central on many agendas and at 
Deloitte we see both our people and our clients 
wanting action; it is no longer a CSR issue and is 
now a key business risk.
This is an area where Scotland has been taking a 
lead.  There has been broad agreement on setting 
some very ambitious targets, including net zero by 
2045, and this has been backed-up with a range 
of Government policy announcements. While 
there are undoubted challenges, there will also be 
significant opportunities.
When we consider the research conducted by our 
universities, our expertise in key sectors such as 
renewables and financial services, Scotland is 
better placed than most to deliver a low carbon 
economy.  If we are to optimise our chances 
of success, then on top of the targets and the 
policy framework, businesses need to consider 
significantly investing in and applying low-carbon 
technologies to achieve long-term change. 
Deloitte supports the production of the Fraser Economic Commentary. It has no control over its editorial content, 
including in particular the Institute’s economic forecasts.
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There are going to be some difficult trade-offs.  
As an example, Oil & Gas UK’s latest Economic 
Report outlines the importance of the sector to our 
economy and the actions the industry is taking 
now to better assess and reduce the emissions 
from the production of hydrocarbons. On the 
other hand, there are those who would argue 
that we should stop developing any new oil & gas 
fields.  Striking the right balance and maintaining 
widespread support will not be easy.
On a wider level, we know that climate change 
is likely to drive some of the biggest change 
to businesses in our lifetime. We believe that 
businesses have a critical role to play in creating 
a better, stronger and more sustainable Scotland. 
For example, at Deloitte, we have committed to 
reduce our building, fleet and travel emissions by 
2025 compared to 2017 levels. The overall effect 
of these goals equates to a 20% reduction in 
our total carbon footprint per fulltime equivalent 
employee.
Looking ahead, will prolonged political 
uncertainty continue to impact on business 
confidence? A good temperature check is 
Deloitte’s latest CFO Survey, which highlights 
that corporate risk appetite is being suppressed 
both by Brexit and economic uncertainty. 58% of 
CFOs say that cost control is a strong priority for 
their business over the next 12 months, higher 
than when the economy was emerging from the 
recession in 2009.  On balance, CFOs expect 
UK corporates to reduce hiring over the next 12 
months while almost half rate increasing cash 
flow as a strong priority for their business. 
On a positive note, while the most recent data 
show a rise in unemployment in Scotland, the 
numbers out of work are at a near record low 
and real earnings are growing. While it is unclear 
whether these trends will be sustainable, 
we should take confidence from the fact that 
businesses in Scotland have long shown 
themselves to be adaptable and resilient to 
change. We now need clarity on what this next 
chapter of change will look like.
John Macintosh  
Tax Partner 
Deloitte
October 2019
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At the time of writing (22nd October), there 
continues to remain significant uncertainty over 
the timing and nature of the UK’s departure from 
the EU. 
Unpicking the impact that this is having on the 
Scottish economy is not an easy task. 
What we do know is that consumer confidence and 
risk appetite amongst businesses remains weak. 
Business investment in the UK has now been 
negative in 5 of the past 6 quarters. 
We also know that growth – whilst volatile – 
remains fragile. 
Shortly before our June Commentary, figures for 
Scotland showed economic activity in Q1 of 2019 
rising at its fastest rate in almost five years. 
At that time, we cautioned that such figures were 
likely to be impacted by firms stockpiling in the 
run-up to the first Brexit deadline of 31st March. 
Consistent with this, the latest figures now show 
that the economy contracted by 0.3% in Q2. 
Unofficial indicators for activity over the summer 
suggests that once the effects of stockpiling are 
accounted for, underlying growth remains weak 
but positive. 
But Scotland’s economy continues to lag behind 
trend. 
There are positives however. Exports have 
performed strongly, with growth of over 4% in 2018, 
holding up well despite rising global trade tensions. 
Unemployment has risen sharply in recent times, 
but remains low by historical standards.  
As we have argued before, forecasting the future 
path of the economy in such times is fraught with 
difficulty. 
 
 
Summary
As per recent Commentaries, we outline a range 
of scenarios. Our central forecast – assuming 
continued uncertainty – is for growth of 1.0% in 
2019, 1.2% in 2020 and 1.3% in 2021. We also have 
weaker and more positive forecasts based upon 
different outcomes to the negotiations. 
Should a deal be secured, then this is likely to lead 
to a better performance in the short-term (relative 
to ongoing uncertainty).
However, Boris Johnson’s deal is a ‘harder’ 
Brexit than the plan put forward by Theresa May. 
Therefore, whilst the short-term outlook may 
improve, the outlook over the longer-term could be 
even more challenging. 
A ‘no deal’ remains a possibility. This would remain 
the most damaging outcome. Interestingly, there is 
some tentative evidence that sentiment around a 
‘no deal’ outcome has improved (or at least become 
less negative). Why? Firstly, preparations for a ‘no 
deal’ outcome have increased. Secondly, we are 
now clearer on the scale of the policy response by 
UK fiscal and monetary authorities. 
Whilst some of the more apocalyptic predictions 
we have seen are wide of the mark, a ‘No deal’ exit 
would still be a major negative economic shock. 
Aside from Brexit, the lack of discussion about 
Scotland’s economic performance remains a 
surprising gap in the policy debate, particularly 
given the tax implications that now face Holyrood. 
The one exception has been climate change. And 
in this Commentary we discuss what a transition to 
net zero might mean for our economy and the risks 
and opportunities ahead.  
Fraser of Allander Institute 
October 2019
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At a glance
2019 2020 2021
GDP 1.0 1.2 1.3
Production 1.2 1.4 1.5
Construction 0.7 0.9 1.0
Services 1.1 1.2 1.3
FAI forecast Scottish economic growth (%), 2019 – 2021, central 
forecast based on orderly departure
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Scottish growth (since 2014) – year and quarter % Employment & unemployment rates, Jun-Aug 2019
FAI forecast Scottish labour market indicators - central forecast 
based on orderly departure
Employment (16-64) Unemployment (16+)
Rate (%) Year Change Rate (%)
Year 
Change
Scotland 74.3 ▼ 4.1 ▲
England 76.3 ▲ 3.9 ▼
Wales 74.1 ▼ 4.2 ▲
N. Ireland 71.5 ▲ 2.9 ▼
UK 75.9 ▲ 3.9 ▼
2019 2020 2021
Employment rate (%)1 75.1 74.9 74.7
Unemployment Rate (%)2 3.8 4.1 4.2
Central forecast
Due to uncertainty around possible Brexit outcomes, 
we have developed a range of different scenarios. More 
information can be found in the ‘Our forecasts’ section.
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Outlook and Appraisal
Brexit uncertainty continues to act as a drag on Scotland’s economy with output around 2% smaller 
(or £3bn) as a result of the weaker performance post-referendum. But Brexit cannot explain all recent 
challenges, and the lack of debate about Scotland’s longer-term performance remains a concern. 
Chart 1: Scottish growth since 2014 - year and quarter %
-0.5%
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Q
ua
rte
rly
 a
nd
 a
nn
ua
l %
 c
ha
ng
e
Quarterly growth Annual growth
Source: Scottish Government
Table 1: FAI GDP growth (%) 2016 forecasts and actual growth
June 2016 
Forecast
FAI December 
2016 Actual
2016 1.4 1 1.1
2017 1.9 1.1 1.1
2018 2 1.3 1.4
2019 - 1.6 1.0*
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
*Forecast for 2019
Chart 2: Business investment in real terms, Scotland, Q1 2010 - 
Q1 2019 
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Introduction
Recent events have given us little clarity over the 
UK’s departure from the EU.
Scotland’s economy contracted by 0.3% in Q2 2019, 
with annual growth slipping to just 0.7%. Chart 1. 
Whilst some of the more extreme predictions for 
how the economy would react to a ‘leave’ vote have 
proved to be wide of the mark, it is clear that there 
has been an impact. 
We estimate that – based upon forecasts prior to the 
EU referendum – our economy is around 2% smaller 
(equivalent to £3 billion) than it should be.  Table 1.
Investment has been most affected, with decisions 
delayed, or worse, cancelled. Chart 2. 
But, not all of Scotland’s below-par performance can 
be explained by Brexit. 
It remains surprising that the performance of the 
economy does not feature more permanently in the 
policy debate. Growth matters:  for incomes and the 
public services that we all depend upon. 
Too often, discussions are dominated by soundbites 
(‘the Scottish economy is resilient’ or ‘the Scottish 
economy lags the UK’). 
And most of the time, debates get no further than 
simply asserting that higher tax rates are to blame 
(despite little evidence to back this up) or that 
the solution is  to spend more money (with no 
explanation of where such monies will come from). 
Similarly, it is increasingly commonplace to divert 
attention from the growth debate by arguing for 
‘wellbeing’, blaming Brexit or asserting that further 
constitutional change will solve all our challenges. 
Brexit will usher in the greatest shift to our economy 
in over a generation. A more open discussion, not 
just of the risks and opportunities that Brexit will 
bring, but the underlying growth dynamics of the 
Scottish economy more generally, is needed.
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Table 2: OECD growth rates (%), 2018 (outturn) to 2020
2018 2019 2020
UK 1.4 1.0 0.9
US 2.9 2.4 2.0
Japan 0.8 1.0 0.6
Canada 1.9 1.5 1.6
Germany 1.5 0.5 0.6
France 1.7 1.3 1.2
Italy 0.7 0.0 0.4
Euro Area 1.9 1.1 1.0
World 3.6 2.9 3.0
Source: OECD 
Chart 3: GDP growth – actual and IMF forecasts, constant prices, 
2000 - 2024
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Chart 4: Business Confidence Index, Jan 2011 – Aug 2019
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The global economy
The slowdown in global growth that we identified 
in the last commentary has intensified over the 
summer. 
As Table 2 highlights, this trend is forecast to 
continue into 2020 (and beyond).
Early last year, the consensus forecast for world 
growth in 2019 was over 4%. The latest predictions 
are for growth of just below 3%.  
While relatively broad-based, the slowdown has 
been particularly acute in a number of countries. 
Europe’s largest economy – Germany – is teetering 
on recession. Italy formally entered recession in late 
2018.  
Some economists are now actively discussing the 
possibility of a new global downturn, just 10 years 
after the financial crisis. 
In our view however, this does seem a little 
pessimistic. Yes, growth has slowed but, on balance, 
activity is expected to remain positive for the 
foreseeable future. Chart 3. 
The latest data suggests that the slowdown in China 
may not be as bad as first thought, whilst growth 
remains relatively resilient in the US.
This is not to say that there are no risks.  
Geo-political tensions, coupled with a proliferation 
of rising trade barriers, have the potential to turn the 
current slowdown into something more serious. 
It is no surprise therefore, that confidence levels – 
particularly in advanced economies – have fallen 
sharply in recent times and now sit below long-term 
trends. Chart 4.
The greatest impact of heightened levels of 
uncertainty has been on investment. 
Global investment is expected to rise by less than 
1% this year, down on the 5% growth of last year.  
When uncertainty becomes deep rooted, reduced 
investment affects not just present day demand but 
also tomorrow’s growth potential. The epicentre of 
the slowdown has been in manufacturing. 
In Germany, industrial output is now down by around 
5% over the year. Chart 5.
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Chart 5: Manufacturing production growth, year on year
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Chart 6: World trade growth, year-on-year (merchandise volume)
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Source: CPB World Trade Monitor, Netherlands Bureau for Economic 
Policy Analysis
Chart 7: Effective Federal funds rate, Jan 2012 – Aug 2019
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It is no surprise that international trade growth is 
also now falling sharply. Chart 6.
In light of these conditions, attention is once again 
returning to policymakers to gauge their response. 
One view is that monetary and fiscal authorities 
need to act decisively with a renewed stimulus. The 
US FED has already acted, with only their second 
rate cut since 2008. Chart 7.
An alternative, albeit less popular view, is for less 
short-term stimulus but a focus upon the structural 
problems within the global economy. 
It is increasingly clear that the current globalisation 
model needs reformed. Like-minded countries 
will need to work together to promote trade, and 
learn lessons from what happens if the gains from 
integration are not shared more equally. 
Whatever the response, Scotland cannot expect to 
be immune from current pressures. 
Somewhat paradoxically, and as we discuss later, 
the last 12 to 18 months have been a strong year for 
Scottish exports. 
But a global slowdown is likely to suppress demand. 
And punitive tariffs, such as the 25% tariff placed 
on Scotch whisky by the US, will act as a significant 
barrier in key markets. 
A global slowdown is also likely to mean that oil 
prices will stay lower (and for longer). Chart 8. 
Despite this, the North Sea sector now seems to be 
more resilient to a lower price environment than five 
years ago. 
Chart 8: Price of oil, Jan 2013 – Oct 2019
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Chart 9: UK economic growth, Q1 2010, Q2 2019
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Chart 10: Composition of UK economic growth, Q1 2017 – Q2 
2019
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Table 3: UK GDP components, June – Aug 2019
Jun 2019 Jul 2019 Aug 2019
GDP 0.1 0.4 -0.1
Services 0.2 0.3 0.0
Production 0.1 0.1 -0.6
Manufacturing -0.3 0.4 -0.7
Construction -1.1 1.8 0.2
Agriculture 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Source: ONS
The UK economy
The UK economy contracted in the 3-months to June 
– the first such contraction since 2012. Chart 9.
Growth was always going to be weaker, as a result of 
the slowdown in the global economy we discussed 
above. However, Brexit uncertainty is clearly having 
an impact. 
In the most recent data, the impact of stockpiling 
(and then its unwinding) is clearly evident.
In the run up to the initial March 31st deadline, firms 
were running up their supplies of both final products 
and inputs. So it was no surprise production output 
rose sharply in Q1 but fell back in Q2.  Chart 10.
But it would be wrong to dismiss these results as 
simply due to temporary volatility. 
Activity in the all-important services sector is weak. 
And whilst more up-to-date data from the ONS 
suggests that activity bounced back somewhat in 
July, performance remains mixed. Table 3.
Whilst the post-referendum recession that George 
Osborne predicted may not have come to pass, 
growth has clearly slowed since 2016. Chart 11.
Annual growth is currently tracking at 1.2%, well 
below long-term trend of over 2%. 
Most estimates are that the economy is now 
between 2% and 2½% lower than where it might 
have been without Brexit uncertainty. This weakness 
has been both more longstanding and more 
extensive than in other major economies.
One area of much greater focus has been the 
potential regional impacts of Brexit.  
Chart 11: G7 economic growth, 2008 – 2018
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Chart 12: Economic growth estimates and PMI measures
North East
Yorkshire and The 
Humber
East Midlands
East of England
London
South East
South West
West Midlands
North West
Wales
Scotland
Northern Ireland
44
46
48
50
52
54
-1.2% -0.8% -0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 0.8%
PM
I S
co
re
 (Q
 a
ve
ra
ge
)
Quarterly growth
Q2 Linear (Q2)
Source: ESCOE
Chart 13: Performance of key economic indicators pre and post-
EU referendum, UK, average quarter on previous year quarter 
growth
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Chart 14: Business investment in the UK, Q1 2010 – Q2 2019
-16
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Q
uarterly grow
th (%
)
In
de
xe
d 
gr
ow
th
 (
20
10
 =
 1
00
) 
Quarterly growth (RHS)
Index (LHS)
Source: ONS
Although we have data on the UK’s Q2 growth, we 
do not have comparable official estimates for much 
of sub UK growth.
As part of our work funded through the Economic 
Statistics Centre of Excellence we have developed 
methods to produce ‘nowcasts’ of economic activity 
across the UK. Our estimates for Q2 are reported in 
Chart 12, alongside the PMI survey data for each part 
of the UK.
These estimates suggest that the economies of 
Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales and the North 
East of England contracted the most in Q2, while the 
North West and Yorkshire & the Humber grew most 
robustly.
One element that has taken a particularly significant 
turn for the worst across the UK has been business 
investment. Chart 13.
Prior to the EU referendum, UK business investment 
growth was growing in line with the G7 average. 
Since then, it has barely risen in the UK, compared 
to growing by an average of >10% elsewhere. 
And in five of the last six quarters, business 
investment in the UK has contracted. Indeed, 
its hard to find a time in the data – outside of a 
recession – where investment has been so weak for 
such a sustained period of time. Chart 14. 
This persistent weakness in investment is despite 
both labour shortages and accommodative financial 
conditions, which are generally supportive for 
businesses to expand operations.
Instead, the risk appetite amongst corporates in the 
UK remains very weak. Chart 15.
Chart 15: % of CFOs that think it is a good time to be taking 
greater risk onto balance sheets
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Chart 16: UK employment rate (aged 16-64), 1979 - 2019
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Table 4: UK labour market indicators, Jun-Aug 2019
Employment (16-64) Unemployment (16+)
Rate (%) Year Change Rate (%)
Year 
Change
Scotland 74.3 ▼ 4.1 ▲
England 76.3 ▲ 3.9 ▼
Wales 74.1 ▼ 4.2 ▲
N. Ireland 71.5 ▲ 2.9 ▼
UK 75.9 ▲ 3.9 ▼
 
ONS (LFS)
Chart 17: Trends in productivity and employment, Q1 2008 – Q2 
2019
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UK labour market indicators
One consequence of the very low levels of 
investment in the UK economy has been to amplify 
the vicious cycle of “low investment: low wage 
employment growth” that we have seen since the 
financial crisis. 
Employment rates in the UK are at their highest 
levels ever. Chart 16.
This trend is consistent right across the UK. Table 4.
Whilst high rates of employment are clearly positive, 
it is clear that much of this pick-up reflects this 
underlying investment weakness in the UK economy 
at the current time. 
Heightened uncertainty effectively raises the cost of 
new capital, and hence businesses will substitute 
new investment for (cheap) employment.
A downside of this is that lower levels of investment 
ultimately feed through to weaker productivity rates. 
As Chart 17 highlights, the growth in productivity has 
lagged behind employment growth for a number of 
years. 
As a result, whilst more people are in work, the 
amount they get paid has been squeezed. This helps 
explain why real wage growth in the UK has been so 
poor for so long.
There are some signs however, that the labour 
market is now close to capacity. This his helping to 
boost wages, with the first sustained improvement 
in earnings in a number of years. 
Chart 18: Average weekly earnings growth rates, Great Britain, 
2003 - 2019
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Chart 19: UK labour productivity and median real hourly wages 
(1997 – 2017)
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Chart 20: The relationship between labour productivity growth & 
wage growth across the wage distribution, UK
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Chart 21: The relationship between labour productivity growth & 
wage growth, low-paid sectors, UK
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Productivity
In the long-run, what really matters for earnings is 
productivity growth. 
As productivity rises it takes fewer hours of work to 
produce the same amount of output. This allows 
employers to increase wages. 
So how has that link been performing in the UK in 
recent years?
Chart 19 shows a clear break in trend growth in both 
productivity and median wages in post-crisis years.
While labour productivity has continued to grow 
albeit at a slower rate, the median real hourly 
wage, the key indicator of earnings of the typical 
UK worker, has fallen over the post-financial crisis 
years. It would appear that the link between labour 
productivity and median real wages has changed.
Chart 20 shows that the link between labour 
productivity growth and real wage growth is 
weakest at lower deciles of the wage distribution in 
comparison to the top deciles. 
[NB: The chart shows productivity coefficient 
estimates and 95% confidence intervals from 
regressions we ran for each decile. For each decile, 
we regress the change in the 3-year moving average 
of wages on average labour productivity.] 
Chart 21 highlights that the relationship is 
particularly weak for low-paid sectors.
The expected positive relationship is not evident 
for the wholesale and retail sector, and is weak and 
insignificant in most other services sector. 
A weak but significant positive relationship is found 
in agriculture, forestry and fishing. For residential 
care and social work sub-sectors we see their real 
wage growth is influenced by productivity growth, 
but that the estimated coefficients are significantly 
below 1. 
All of this suggests that policy needs not just to 
focus on boosting productivity across the board 
but it might need to target the areas of this weak 
productivity in particular sectors and the nature (and 
relative bargaining power) of people in that sector. 
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Chart 22: CBI measures of confidence for the UK, Q1 2015 – Q3 
2019
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Chart 23: Purchasing Manager’s Index (PMI) for the UK, Jan 2015 
– Sep 2019
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Chart 24: Contributions to annual consumer credit growth, Q1 
2013 – Q2 2019
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UK outlook
The outlook for the UK economy remains highly 
uncertain. 
As highlighted above, the most recent official 
statistics show growth returning in July, but slipping 
back in August.
In recent trends, Business surveys have pointed to a 
more negative outlook.
Surveys do need to be interpreted with a degree of 
caution as the link between sentiment and actual 
activity can be weak.
For example, in the aftermath of the EU referendum, 
most survey indicators fell significantly. However, on 
this occasion growth continued.
That being said, it is clear that levels of activity are 
weaker than normal.  
The CBI’s Business Confidence index in Q3 was at its 
lowest level since 2016 (with a clear downward trend 
evident). Chart 22.
Confidence appears negative irrespective of the size 
of company. 
All of the latest PMI indicators are below the cut-off 
value of 50 (where >50 marks expansion and <50 
contraction). 
Services are now tracking at 49.5, whilst 
manufacturing PMIs have been below 50 for 5 
months. 
The figures for construction are particularly weak. 
Chart 23. Indeed the figure of 43 is the 2nd worst 
reading since April 2009. And consistent with 
the overall decline in business investment, the 
commercial property market has been particularly 
impacted. 
Away from the business community, the economy 
has been supported by strong growth by the 
consumer. 
However, there are signs that this too is easing. 
Chart 24, with credit levels falling back. 
Credit growth has been slowing since the EU 
referendum and is now at its lowest level in five 
years. Much of this decline is coming from a fall back 
in longer-term financing such as for cars.  
Of course, sentiment can change quickly. Should a 
deal be agreed then those surveys are likely to turn 
around.
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Chart 25: How much has the result of the EU referendum 
affected the level of uncertainty affecting your business? 
September 2016 – August 2019
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Chart 26: Brexit contingency plans, Q3 2019
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Chart 27: Preparations and expectations of companies for a 
deal and no-deal Brexit
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As highlighted above, UK growth figures have been 
distorted in recent times by the impact of stockpiling 
on activity. 
More generally, the level of Brexit-planning being 
undertaken by businesses across the UK has clearly 
picked-up. 
It is not hard to see why. The proportion of 
businesses in the UK say that Brexit is one of the 
most important uncertainties that they face has 
increased sharply in recent months. Chart 25.
Chart 26 shows the extent of Brexit planning taking 
place, with many businesses clearly now operating 
upon a rolling basis of continual contingency work 
planning. 
The challenge of course is that a great many of 
these activities will do little to aid the long-term 
productivity or efficiency of their business and is 
instead all about minimising negative impacts. 
Of those undertaking contingency plans, many are 
now more confident about their readiness for ‘no 
deal’.  Chart 27.
The turnaround in sentiment amongst businesses to 
Brexit is interesting, whilst they think that it will be a 
challenge for them, they believe that they have been 
able to put in place appropriate plans.
Whilst most independent forecasters have revised 
upwards (slightly) their sentiment around the impact 
of a ‘no deal’, there is a weakening in terms of the 
overall expectations about future growth for the 
remainder of this year and next. Chart 28. 
Chart 28: Time path of average of independent forecasts for the 
UK economy
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Scottish Economy Dashboard
-0.3% 2.3%
 ■ The first contraction in growth since 2018 Q2 for 
the constructuion sector, bringing the period of 
sustained growth to an end. 
0.7% 1.0%
 ■ There was a contraction in growth of -0.3% in 
Q2 after growth 0.6% in Q1 with the unwinding 
effects of stockpiling in Q1 now evident. 
GDP
Annual Growth 5-Year Average Annual Growth Key trends 
-0.7% 0.6%
 ■ The production sector felt the effect of 
stockpiling the most in Q2, with growth 
contracting -2.5%.
 ■ The sector was the biggest contributor to the 
contraction in growth in 2019 Q2. 
Production
1.1% 0.9%
 ■ Growth in the services sector improved in Q2
 ■ In the last year, the bulk of the services sector’s 
growth has been driven by financial services. 
 ■ Additionally, IT and accommodation services 
have been performning well whilst retail 
slipped back into negative growth.
Services
-0.8% 0.7%
 ■ Agriculture recovered from last quarter when 
annual growth was -2.6% however, growth in 
this sector remained fragile into the second 
quarter of this year
Agriculture
Construction
 ■ Exports slipped back in Q1 of 2019, after strong 
growth last year
 ■ However, export growth remains positive and 
just below its five-year average. 
 ■ Business investment declined further in Q1 
2019 after a turbulent year in 2018.
 ■ Brexit uncertainty continues to halt investment 
and the latest data indicates that investment in 
January-March of this year was deeply effected.
Exports
Business 
Investment
Employment
Unemployment
74.3% -0.6 pp  ■ Employment fell by 1.4 percentage point in Q3, with approx. 60,000 fewer people in 
employment than earlier this year. 
4.1% 0.2 pp  ■ Unemployment increased by 0.8 percentage point in Q3, the largest quarterly increase in 4 
years. 
Level
Change over  
year Key trends
Productivity 1.1% 0.9%  ■ Productivity (output per hour) increased by 0.4% in 2019 Q1.
2.4% 2.7%
-4.3% 4.9%
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Chart 29: Scottish economic growth, Q1 2014 – Q2 2019
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Chart 30: Composition of economic growth in Scotland over Q2 
2019 and Q1 2019
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Chart 31: Scottish and UK production sector growth over last year
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The Scottish economy
The latest official data – covering the 3-month 
period to June 2019 - shows that the Scottish 
economy contracted by 0.3%. Chart 29.
This followed strong growth of 0.6% in Q1 2019. 
Like the UK, the key driver appears to be stockpiling 
in the run-up to the 1st Brexit deadline of 31st 
March. 
As Chart 30 highlights, growth was pulled down in 
Q2 by a sharp drop in production output, coupled 
with a decline in construction activity.
In contrast, in Q1 construction and production both 
made a positive contribution to growth. Indeed, over 
half of the pickup came from production (just 17% of 
the Scottish economy).
The volatility in the data is clearly evident from the 
quarterly behaviour of the production sector over 
the last year – see Chart 31. This is no more evident 
than in manufacturing, which grew by 2.3% in Q1, 
but then shrank by 2.5% in Q2.
Such volatility means that comparisons to a year 
ago, or across the UK, provide a more meaningful 
basis to assess economic performance.
Growth for the year to Q2 was +0.7%. As has been 
a trend in recent times, Scotland has grown more 
slowly than the UK as a whole (UK growth = 1.2%.)
On a per capita basis, growth in Scotland over the 
year was just 0.1% compared to 0.6% in the UK.
Annual growth – either on an aggregate or per capita 
basis – remains below Scotland’s long-term trend 
growth. Chart 32.
Chart 32: Scottish GDP, average annual growth rate, 1973 - 2018
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Chart 33: Sectoral output and GDP trends
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Chart 34: Scottish GDP against pre-recession (pre-Q2 2008) and 
pre-referendum (pre-Q2 2016) trends
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Table 5: Quarterly GDP growth estimates in 2015 v. 2019
Initial estimates 
(Q3 2015)
Latest estimates 
(Q2 2019)
2015 Q1 0.6% 0.2%
2015 Q2 0.1% -0.3%
2015 Q3 0.1% -0.2%
Source: Scottish Government
This weaker performance appears to be relatively 
broad-based. Chart 33.
The construction sector has had the greatest 
challenges, and has yet to recover the lost ground 
during the financial crisis. 
But more generally, output in the service sector 
and production industries have broadly performed 
in line with the recent (weaker) performance in the 
economy as a whole. 
Interestingly, whilst some of the recent weakness 
in the Scottish economy can be pinned on Brexit 
uncertainty, the actual trend in activity since early 
2016 (and the run up to the EU referendum) is 
broadly in line with the period between 2010 and 
2016. Chart 34.
And since 2016, the Scottish economy has grown 4% 
compared to 5% in the UK and 7% in the EU. 
One interesting development is that Scotland is now 
thought to have been in a mild recession in 2015.
Between Q1 and Q3 2015, the Scottish economy 
contracted by 0.6% (with a fall of 0.3% in Q2 and 
0.2% in Q3). Recall that this was at the height of 
the downturn in the oil price. However, the initial 
estimates published by the Scottish Government 
were for growth of 0.1% in both quarters. Table 5.
The annual growth revisions were larger. Two years 
ago, the statistics were pointing to growth of over 
2% in 2015 but today’s figures suggest growth was 
just a quarter of that (at 0.5%). Chart 35.
Chart 35: Scottish GDP growth with the latest data and 
estimates from July 2017, Q1 2014 – Q1 2017
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Chart 36: International exports and GDP, Scotland, 2008 - 2018
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Table 6: Composition of GDP (excl. imports) by expenditure type, 
2009 - 2019
2009 Q1 2019 Q1 Difference 
Households 65% 61% -4 p.p.
Government 26% 24% -2 p.p.
Gross Capital 
Formation
14% 19% 5 p.p.
NPISH 2% 2% 0 p.p.
Net Trade -7% -6% 1 p.p.
Exports 53% 55% 2 p.p.
Imports -60% -61% -1 p.p.
Source: Scottish Government, QNAS
Chart 37: Business investment, Scotland, 2008 - 2018
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Looking at trends over the year, we see that one area 
of positivity has been the performance of Scottish 
international exports. Chart 36.
As we have discussed in previous commentaries, 
Scotland’s export performance has – in the past – 
lagged behind many of our key competitors. 
In May, the Scottish Government published a new 
strategy which was much bolder in its approach to 
supporting businesses to grow their international 
footprint than we have perhaps seen in the past. 
In recent times, Scottish exports have actually grown 
more quickly than the domestic economy. Indeed, 
since 2016, international exports have grown by 9% 
in real terms, compared to 4% growth in GDP. Table 
6. As a result, export as a share of our economy 
has grown in recent years, highlighting just how 
international the Scottish economy is. 
On the other side of the coin, one area where 
performance has been weak has been in investment. 
As Chart 37 highlights, business investment in 
Scotland had been growing relatively steadily from 
2010 onwards. However, from 2016 it has increased 
only marginally. 
Like the UK as a whole, a key reason for this appears 
to be ongoing Brexit uncertainty.
A similar trend can be picked up from commercial 
property data in Scotland. Chart 38. 
We can illustratively estimate the impact of factors 
such as Brexit uncertainty on business investment 
using a series of trends to act as upper and lower 
bounds to business investment had previous trends 
continued. 
Comparing these trends with actual business 
investment in Q1 2019 indicates the cost of these 
factors to business investment. 
We find that if the economy had continued growing 
at a pre-2016 growth trend then business investment 
would be between a conservative 2.6% larger and 
optimistic 13.7% larger. This is equivalent to around 
£100m - £550m of lost investment.
While Brexit will not account for all of this difference, 
the uncertainty that has surrounded the economy 
over the past few years has played an important role.
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Chart 38: Sales & volume of commercial property transactions, 
2008 - 2019
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
Value (£m
)V
ol
um
e
Volume of sales (LHS) Value of sales (RHS)
Source: Registers of Scotland
Chart 39: GDP difference by sector, UK minus Scotland, Q2 2010 
– Q2 2019 *
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Chart 40: Oil and gas production and income, Scotland, 1998 - 
2018
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Over the longer-term, growth in Scotland continues 
to lag behind trend. 
As an illustration, Chart 39 shows the relative growth 
gap by sector between Scotland and the UK since 
2010.
Some of this is clearly down to the downturn in oil 
and gas. 
As Chart 40 highlights, output in oil and gas has 
been falling since 1999 – with the exception of 
modest increases in more recent years. But during 
this time of rising output, prices fell rapidly. 
As a result, sectors across the Scottish economy 
have slipped back. 
But the relative balance of sectors which have 
performed more slowly than the UK suggests that oil 
and gas spill-over effects cannot be the only reason. 
Chart 41 shows the resilience of Scottish sectors 
to both the Great Recession (Q1 2009) and the 
downturn in oil prices (Q1 2015). 
As the chart shows, whilst most sectors except 
electricity and gas supply and construction have 
bounced back from 2009 levels, there remains 
significant variation in performance. A similarly 
diverse picture emerges in terms of performance 
since 2015. 
Interestingly, business and financial services - the 
epi-centre of the financial crisis - has performed 
relatively strongly. 
Chart 41: Growth of sectors since the pre-recession peaks of 
2008 (Q2 2008) and 2015 (Q1 2015)*
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Table 7: UK Labour market, Jun-Aug 2019
Employment 
(16-64)
Unemployment 
(16+)
Inactivity 
(16-64)
Scotland (%) 74.3 4.1 22.5
Quarterly change 
(p.p.)
-1.4 0.8 0.8
Annual change 
(p.p.)
-0.6 0.2 0.5
UK (%) 75.9 3.9 21.0
Quarterly change 
(p.p.)
-0.2 0.1 0.1
Annual change 
(p.p.)
0.3 -0.2 -0.2
Source: ONS (LFS)
Chart 42: Employment and unemployment rate in Scotland, Apr-
Jun 2010 - Jun-Aug 2019
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Chart 43: Change in the employment rate in Scotland and the UK 
relative to the three months and year before, Jun-Aug 2019
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Scottish labour market and productivity
While UK and Scottish labour market indicators 
remain strong relative to historical standards, the 
most recent data suggests some weakening in these 
measures.
Scottish unemployment jumped 0.8 percentage 
points, and employment fell 1.4 percentage points, 
in the most recent data covering the three months to 
August. Table 7.
This means that relative to earlier in this year, 
20,000 more people are unemployed in Scotland, 
and nearly 60,000 fewer people are in employment. 
Chart 42.
Relative to a year ago, the same is true: the 
employment rate is 0.6 percentage points lower and 
the unemployment rate 0.2 percentage points higher 
in Scotland. 
In the UK in contrast, the employment rate is 0.3 
percentage points higher, and the unemployment 
rate 0.2 percentage points lower than a year ago.
While the economic headwinds caused by Brexit are 
real, this does not fully explain these data. Chart 43.
One way to see this is to remember that Brexit 
uncertainty is not isolated to Scotland, by definition 
it affects all parts of the UK. In this sense it is a 
‘common shock’ to the economies of the UK. Chart 
44.
It should be noted however, that regional 
employment data is more volatile than for the UK as 
a whole, so some of these movements are likely to 
reflect a degree of inherent volatility in the series.
Chart 44: Change in the employment rate across the UK relative 
to the three months and year before, Jun-Aug 2019
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Chart 45: Employment rate (16-64), 2007 & 2018, for the nations 
of the UK
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Chart 46: Nominal median quarterly pay, Scotland v UK, 2015 - 
2019 
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Chart 47: Real productivity growth, Q1 2007 - Q1 2019, Scotland
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When we compare performance across all parts of 
the UK, we can see diverse economic experiences 
over the past year.
Some parts of the UK have seen their employment 
rate improve substantially (East Midlands, South 
East, South West and Northern Ireland), while others 
have seen their employment rate fall substantially 
(like Scotland, Wales and London).
Comparing employment rates of the nations of the 
UK since the pre-financial crisis peak, Scotland has 
seen the smallest improvement in its employment 
rate. Chart 45.
Alongside these headline employment numbers it is 
important to consider what is happening to those in 
work. 
As highlighted in the recent Joseph Rowntree report 
“Poverty in Scotland: 2019”, substantial challenges 
remain around in-work poverty, and the conditions 
for those in work.
Nominal wage growth in Scotland has increased 
more sharply in the latest data, returning nominal 
wage growth over the past few years to more closely 
match that of the UK as a whole - albeit UK wage 
growth itself has underperformed expectations in 
recent years. Chart 46.
This is consistent with the productivity growth seen 
in Scotland in 2017-2018, albeit this improvement 
has slowed at the start of 2019. Chart 47. 
Since the financial crisis in 2007/08 Scottish 
productivity, in terms of output per hour worked, has 
increased by 10.3%, or an average of just over 0.9% 
per year. This compares to an average annual growth 
rate of 1.5% per year between 1998 and 2007.
It is always important to consider whether it 
is changes in hours worked or in how much is 
being produced that is driving improvements in 
productivity. 
Over the past year or so the growth in hours worked 
has been relatively modest, with most of the 
improvement in productivity over the period coming 
from faster output growth. Indeed hours worked has 
still not recovered to pre-financial crisis levels. Chart 
47.
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Chart 48: Forecasts and reconciliations
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Chart 49: Income tax ‘net tax’ position at successive fiscal 
events
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Chart 50: Evolving outlook for the resource block grant at 
successive budget events, 2019/20 prices
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Scottish Budget Outlook
Next month we will be publishing our 4th annual 
Scotland’s Budget report.
It will contain an updated assessment of the outlook 
for the budget, scheduled for publication by the 
Government on the 12th December. 
There have been a number of developments over 
the summer with respect to Scotland’s devolved 
finances. 
Firstly, we had the outturn data for how Scottish tax 
receipts had performed in 2017/18 – the first full 
year of tax devolution – alongside equivalent data 
for the UK. 
This has confirmed that a gap has opened up 
between outturn revenues and the forecasts that 
were used to determine the 2017/18 budget. As 
a result, the Scottish Budget for 2020/21 will be 
reduced by just over £200 million. Chart 48.
Perhaps of greater concern are the estimates for 
future years. It is now believed that reconciliations 
totalling over £1 billion will be required by 2022/23. 
The reason for this has been weaker growth in 
Scottish tax revenues – particularly driven by  a 
slower pick-up in earnings – than originally thought. 
As a result, despite the Scottish Government raising 
an additional £500 million in income tax than 
under the UK policy, this has been offset by weaker 
performance in the Scottish tax base. Chart 49.
A number of factors however, will help offset this 
outlook. 
Firstly, the government has around £570 million 
in reserve from money unspent in previous years 
which it can draw upon. Indeed, despite significant 
spending pressures it added to its reserve in 
2018/19. 
Secondly, the new Chancellor - Sajid Javid – has 
announced a significant uplift in spending across 
the UK (up 4.1% in real-terms). Via the Barnett 
Formula, this spending will be passed on to the 
Scottish budget. Chart 50.
As a result, the block grant is on track to increase 
next year by the fastest rate since the financial crisis.
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Chart 51: Nominal GVA(B) growth for NUTS 3 regions, index 
(1998=100), 1998 - 2017
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Chart 52: 9-year average annual employment growth in Scottish 
local authorities, 2010 - 2019
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Chart 53: 8-year average annual population growth in Scottish 
local authorities, 2010 - 2018
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The rise of the East
An interesting feature of recent data for Scotland is 
the shifting balance of economic activity toward the 
east of the country. 
Edinburgh is the fastest growing city in Scotland and 
is outpacing the national average. Chart 51.
GVA per head in Edinburgh is now £44,000, 
compared to a Scottish average of 25,500. 
The concentration of activity to the east of Scotland  
is becoming more noticeable. 
A significant amount of employment growth in 
recent years has been driven by Edinburgh and its 
surrounding areas (with Glasgow doing well too). 
Chart 52.
Unsurprisingly, the population levels in local 
authorities in the east are growing at some of the 
fastest rates of any part of the country. Chart 53.
This is being mirrored in housing supply growth. 
New housing in Edinburgh, Midlothian, East Lothian, 
West Lothian, Falkirk and Fife made up 24% of 
Scotland’s new housing stock in 2010-11, but 35% in 
2017-18.
However, affordability is increasingly becoming an 
issue. Chart 54.
Most predictions are that this shift in the balance 
of economic activity will continue. In particular, the 
demographic profile of the east of the country is 
much more favourable, with positive migration and a 
younger population base.  
All of this poses challenging questions for future 
investment, particularly around infrastructure 
spending. Should investment be targeted at areas 
growing strongly, or to help weaker areas ‘catch-up’?
Chart 54: Housing affordability in Scotland, 2018
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Table 8: Scottish business monitor headline results, Q3 2019
Q3 2019 Quarter change
Year 
change
FAI Business Activity 
Index (net % balance)
5 -9 ▼  -11 ▼  
New business 3 -8 ▼  -12 ▼  
Turnover 8 -5 ▼  -12 ▼  
Costs 56  5 ▲   2 ▲ 
New capital 
investment
-3  4 ▲    8 ▲ 
Export activity -8 3 ▲  -8 ▼  
Source: Scottish Business Monitor, FAI
Table 9: Trend in volume of business activity, net response of 
firms
Budget year
2018 2019
Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3
Construction 25% 22% 21% 0% -6%
Retail & wholesale -9% 0% 0% 8% -14%
Manufacturing 17% 7% -2% 12% -2%
Accommodation & food 14% 0% 24% 17% -32%
Finance 42% 35% 0% 32% 25%
Source: Scottish Business Monitor, FAI
Chart 55: Key cost pressures now and in future
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Latest Scottish indicators
The latest up-to-date indicators of performance 
in the Scottish economy tend to show a relatively 
mixed picture. 
Our own measure of economic activity – the FAI 
Business Activity Index – has fallen over the quarter, 
but remains positive. See Table 8. 
The net balance of +5 suggests that, on average, 
businesses in Scotland continue to grow with a 
majority reporting an improved order book. 
But on most key indicators, activity was down over 
the year, with steady falls in both turnover and new 
business won. 
The downturn was consistent across most major 
sectors of the economy. The one exception was 
financial services where firms reported strong 
growth over Q2 and Q3. See Table 9. 
One particularly clear message from the survey 
was a trend in rising costs. This was believed to 
be taking place across credit, imports and wages. 
Expectations are for these pressures to build in 
the next 6 months – with 71% of firms surveyed 
expecting costs to increase. 
Like UK wide surveys we are picking up evidence 
of more firms preparing for Brexit, including the 
possibility of a ‘no deal’. 
The number of firms who are saying that they are 
‘not prepared’ has fallen to around 25%. This is a 
sharp fall on previous surveys.
Chart 56: Preparation for a ‘no-deal’ Brexit
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Chart 57: Purchasing Manager’s Index, Scotland & UK, Jan 2016 
- Aug 2019
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Chart 58: Scottish Government Consumer Sentiment Index, 
current conditions, Q2 2013 - Q3 2019
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Chart 59: Scottish Government Consumer Sentiment Index, 
expectations of the Scottish economy, Q2 2013 - Q3 2019
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The latest Purchasing Managers Index for Scotland 
shows a score of 50 – exactly on the point of cut-off 
between growth and expansion. Within this, there 
was a marginal expansion in the service sector 
but a sharp fall in manufacturing output (the joint-
quickest since December 2010).
As highlighted above, the UK PMI data is also weak. 
Scotland is currently in the middle-of-the-pack in 
terms of nations and English regions. Chart 57.
On the consumer side of things, a particularly 
pessimistic set of results have been published in 
recent times. 
For example, the Scottish Government’s consumer 
sentiment indicator stood at -6.6 in Q3 2019 – down 
on the quarter but higher than the series low of -9.6 
obtained in Q1 2019. Chart 58.
Once again, perceptions over the outlook for the 
Scottish economy were a key driving factor. The 
relative balance of respondents who believe that the 
outlook for the Scottish economy is ‘getting worse’ 
comfortably outstrips those who believe it to be 
‘getting better’. 
Consistent with this, and with the recent declines 
in official labour market indicators, surveys of 
hiring intentions have also fallen. The IHS Markit 
Scottish Employment Monitor feel once again during 
September. Chart 60.
Chart 60: Employment barometer, Jan 2013 - Sep 2019
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Table 10: FAI Nowcasts for Scotland’s GDP, Q3 2019
Q3 2019
Quarterly Growth 0.28%
Annualised growth 1.13%
Source: FAI
Chart 61: FAI central forecast and scenarios Q1 2018 - Q4 2021
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Table 11: Latest growth forecasts for the UK economy
2019 2020 2021
Bank of England 1.3% 1.3% 2.3%
OBR 1.2% 1.4% 1.6%
NIESR 1.2% 1.1% 1.8%
European Commission 1.3% 1.3% -
IMF 1.2% 1.4% 1.5%
Oxford Economics 1.2% 1.1% -
ITEM Club 1.2% 1.2% -
CBI 1.4% 1.5% -
Source: HM Treasury, Bank of England, OBR
Table 12: NIESR forecasts of the UK GDP, 2019 - 2023
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Central  
forecast 
1.2% 1.1% 1.8% 1.6% 1.7%
Orderly 
no-deal 
1.0% 0.0% 2.2% 0.8% 0.6%
Source: NIESR
Our forecasts
Economic forecasting in the midst of the ongoing 
uncertainty is challenging.  
As a result, all economic forecasts need to be 
viewed with caution. 
Our latest nowcasts indicate weaker growth this 
quarter. See Table 10.
Even if an exit deal is reached – or a further 
extension is put in place – much of the UK’s future 
relationship with the EU will remain unresolved. So a 
period of uncertainty is here to stay. 
There may also be a trade-off between short-term 
uncertainty and longer-term growth. 
For example, Boris Johnson’s new plan is for a 
‘harder’ Brexit than that put forward by Theresa 
May. As a result, whilst demand may pick-up in the 
short-term if there is an agreement, the longer term 
challenges may be more negative if the end-result is 
greater trade barriers and less integration with our 
key export partner.  
In the light of all this, we continue to present a 
series of scenarios for how the Scottish economy 
may evolve over the next three years. Chart 61.
As always, the exact point estimates are less 
important than the scale and direction of travel. 
Our central forecast should be interpreted as a 
scenario based on a number of different elements: 
leaving at some point in the next 6 months in 
an orderly fashion, but with further decisions 
postponed around the future relationship between 
the UK and the EU.  
Here we forecast growth of 1.0% in 2019, 1.2% in 
2020 and 1.3% in 2021. Table 13.
In this ‘prolonged uncertainty’ scenario, growth is 
likely to continue in much the same vein as in recent 
months. That is, investment and private sector 
spending remains weak, but day-to-day activity in 
our economy remains more resilient. 
Overall, our forecasts are not dissimilar to those for 
the UK as a whole. Table 11 and 12.
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Table 13:  FAI central forecast and scenarios, 2019 - 2021
2019 2020 2021
Central forecast 1.0% 1.2% 1.3%
No deal (no policy response) 0.0% -2.4% 1.6%
No deal (“managed” policy 
response)
0.6% -0.3% 1.3%
Business Investment unlocked 1.0% 1.5% 1.6%
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
We estimate that impacts occur in Q4 2019. For the no-deal (no 
policy response) scenario, the “peak-to-trough” contraction is 
3.7%, and for the no-deal (“managed” policy response) scenario 
the “peak-to-trough” contraction is 1.3%.
Table 14:  FAI central forecast Scottish GDP growth 2019 to 2021
2019 2020 2021
GDP 1.0% 1.2% 1.3%
Production 1.2% 1.4% 1.5%
Construction 0.7% 0.9% 1.0%
Services 1.1% 1.2% 1.3%
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
Table 15: FAI Labour Market forecasts to 2021
2019 2020 2021
Employment rate1 75.1% 74.9% 74.7%
Unemployment Rate2 3.8% 4.1% 4.2%
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
1 Rate calculated as total employment divided by total of 
economically active population aged 16-64.  
2 Rate calculated as total unemployment divided by total of 
economically active population aged 16 and over.
 
On balance, we expect both services and production 
to continue in line with recent trends - that is, 
positive growth but below trend. In contrast, 
construction activity is likely to remain particularly 
fragile with investment remaining weak. Table 14. 
For our other scenarios, we take the ‘impact’ point 
as Q4 2019, given the scheduled departure date of 
October. 
Q4 provides an illustrative starting point to show the 
range of outcomes. (Of course, other outcomes are 
possible). 
On the whole, the degree of negative sentiment 
against a ‘no deal’ outcome has – if anything – 
reduced in recent times.
Business preparations have intensified whilst the 
government has committed to helping support 
the economy in the short-run. Overall however, we 
still take the view that a ‘no deal’ would represent 
an economic shock and it seems at least highly 
probably that Scotland will enter recession at some 
point in 2020. Table 13.
However, the scale of any downturn is likely to be 
much less than some of the apocalyptic warnings 
that have been put forward by some. These 
scenarios rely upon no policy response (which is 
unrealistic) and a series of worst case outcomes.
Instead, we forecast a decline in 2020 of around 1% 
to 2% as a result of a ‘no deal’ outcome. 
And even then, an economy is remarkably resilient 
and growth will pick-up again once the immediate 
dislocation impacts unwind. 
But this comes with a number of caveats. Firstly, it 
is over the longer-term that the key challenges of 
Brexit will become evident. Secondly, the impact 
on individual businesses and industries will vary 
greatly. Those plugged in to complex supply chains 
or reliant upon EU sales for growth are most at risk. 
Of course, there is a ‘best’ case scenario, where 
the recent uncertainty is reduced and confidence 
returns. A positive ‘deal’, which includes a 
commitment to a productive long-term relationship 
with the EU should help growth surprise on the 
upside. 
In all scenarios, employment is likely to remain 
at near record levels, particularly with investment 
continuing to remain fragile in the short to medium 
term. Table 15.
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Policy context
Scotland’s climate emergency
One of the frustrations with the ongoing Brexit 
burach is that important debates about the future of 
our economy have been crowded out. 
As we have highlighted in previous Commentaries, 
Scotland faces a number of significant structural 
challenges. Our population will age significantly, 
whilst – for many – the world of work will change 
radically as existing tasks are increasingly 
automated.  
But there are also opportunities, with new markets 
opening up and technology helping to support 
improvements in living standards. 
One area that has captured the public attention has 
been climate change. Across the world, we have 
seen a renewed desire from governments to step up 
their response to the environmental challenge.
Global CO2 emissions rose sharply at the start of 
this century and, despite a range of international 
initiatives, they remain at near record high levels. 
The consequences of a rapidly changing climate for 
the vital ecosystems on which we all depend are 
hugely significant.    
Chart 62: Global CO2 emissions from fossil fuel & cement 
emissions, 1997 - 2017
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Source: Global Carbon Project
In April, the First Minister declared a ‘global climate 
emergency’. 
Just last month, the Scottish Parliament passed 
a new Climate Change Bill, which legally binds 
the Scottish Government to achieve ‘net zero’ by 
2045 – five years ahead of the UK. An opposition 
amendment to up an interim target, to achieve a 
75% reduction by 2030, was also supported. 
This puts Scotland as one of the most ambitious 
countries in the world in terms of its commitment to 
tackling climate change. 
Of course, targets do not themselves reduce 
emissions. 
The Scottish Government has backed up its 
ambitions with a range of policy announcements, 
most recently in September’s Programme for 
Government, on transport, housing and business 
investment. This is clearly an area where Holyrood 
is setting a bold agenda, with a consistency of 
approach, visibility of leadership and commitment 
to action that sets it apart from the rest of the UK. 
The Committee on Climate Change’s chairman Lord 
Deben commented on Scotland’s ambitious target: 
“Scotland has led the UK in reducing its emissions 
and has ambitions to lead the world in tackling 
climate change: this Programme for Government 
suggests that vision is alive and well”.
But the scale of the challenge – in both Scotland 
and the UK – should not be underestimated.  
Achieving such significant reductions in CO2 
emissions will require a fundamental change within 
nearly every aspect of day-to-day life, including the 
way we heat our homes, the locations and types of 
new building stocks, the sources of our food supply 
and the transport systems we depend upon. 
It is not clear that the true scale and pace of this 
change required is yet fully appreciated. 
Moreover, many of the most difficult – and 
unpopular – decisions have yet to be taken. The 
hope that technologies such as carbon capture and 
storage, hydrogen or large scale battery capabilities, 
will come to the rescue and so minimise the need 
for substantial changes to the lives of households 
across Scotland remains a risky bet. 
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And even if net zero is achieved globally by 2050, 
the science suggests that our climate will continue 
to warm. So alongside efforts to reduce emissions, 
policymakers will need to plan for coping with this 
reality. 
The transition to net zero
In 2009, the Scottish Parliament passed a ground-
breaking Climate Change Act which bound the 
government to reduce emissions by 80% by 2050 
from a 1990 baseline.
Over time, Scotland has seen significant emission 
reductions, with total emissions almost half the 
1990 level. 
Chart 63: Total emissions in Scotland, 1990 - 2016
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Whilst this reduction is significant – and ahead 
of most EU countries – Scotland now plans to go 
further, and over a much shorter time period. 
The strides made in reducing emissions have been 
spread across different sectors of Scottish society.
Chart 64: Scottish emissions by sector, 1990 & 2016
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Energy supply has clearly been a major success 
story. Scotland now has the second highest 
percentage of renewable electricity in the EU, 
increasing the proportion of consumption generated 
by renewables from 20% in 2007 to over 75% in 
2018. 
But to reach net zero, there will need to be much 
more. Electricity demand will rise rapidly as more 
systems — such as cars, buses and heating — shift 
from fossil fuels. To meet future demand, renewable 
generation is likely to have to quadruple in capacity.
In other areas, progress has been slow. 
Scotland has amongst the lowest levels of 
renewable heat source in Europe. 
With around 80% of Scotland on the gas grid, 
converting millions of households to renewable 
sources will be a major undertaking. From 2025, gas 
boilers will no longer be fitted in new homes. 
Chart 65: Total final energy consumption by sector
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But for existing homes (75% of Scotland’s housing 
stock was built prior to 1982) a scalable solution – 
whether through local heat networks, heat pumps or 
hydrogen – is needed. 
There has yet to be any large-scale trials for any of 
these technologies. And it is likely to be years before 
they are tested to a standard to operate across 
Scotland’s housing stock and environment. This is 
one area where there is an urgent need for a more 
ambitious – and deliverable – plan for change.
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Similarly, whilst other sectors have decarbonised, 
transport has not. Surface transport emissions have 
now risen for the fourth consecutive year. When 
including aviation and shipping, transport is now 
Scotland’s single largest source of greenhouse 
gases, accounting for 37 per cent of emissions. 
The electrification of our transport network is for 
example a daunting task. More than 70% of Glasgow 
residents live without private off-street parking with 
limited capacity to install charging facilities. Much 
also depends upon manufacturers bringing enough 
new electric cars to market. 
While a large part of cutting emissions will stem 
from renewables and cutting back on our energy 
demand, industries such as steel, petrochemicals, 
and construction will still produce large amounts of 
CO2. Solutions for these industries will be needed. 
A further radical change is likely to be required over 
land use, with the need for new forests both to help 
offset any remaining emissions and as a source of 
bio-fuel. But how much of Scotland’s countryside 
will be impacted even just to generate 10% of heat 
demand from biomass? Similarly, what might be 
the implications from radical efforts to restore 
peatlands?
The political and environmental implications of 
changing Scotland’s eco-system, and re-imagining 
land-use management, in radical ways should not 
be underestimated. 
How much – and what – we eat is also likely to 
change. Agriculture is a major source of emissions. 
A combination of changes to sourcing of food, diet 
and waste will all be required.  The Committee 
on Climate Change believe that we will need to 
reduce consumption of meat and dairy by 20% (at 
least). This is one area where Brexit provides an 
opportunity to design a new post-CAP framework 
that has a greater role for low-carbon farming 
practices. 
But even with such changes, current plans are 
still heavily dependent upon much of the heavy 
lifting coming from new technologies that are in 
their infancy or have yet to be even invented. Their 
development, cost and timing of deployment are all 
elements that the Scottish Government has little, if 
any, influence over. 
All of this will require a level of investment and 
degree of economic planning not seen since the 
Second World War. 
The policy agenda
The establishment of high-level targets are clearly 
an important step. 
And the announcements in this parliamentary 
term are significant. But collectively, they will still 
only make a small dent in the scale of the change 
needed. 
At the UK level, the Committee on Climate Change 
concluded in July that progress was generally “off-
track” in most sectors, with only seven out of 24 
indicators where they should be in 2018. 
Arguably, many of the ‘quick-wins’ – e.g. in 
renewable electricity – have been made. Many more 
will not be as easy. 
The scale of the progress required is hugely 
significant. 
Chart 66: Share of renewable energy in gross final energy 
consumption, Scotland, 2009 - 2017 (with targets)
7.5%
19.1%
30.0%
50.0%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2020 2030
%
 o
f e
ne
rg
y 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
Target
Target
Source: Scottish Government, BEIS
Many of the changes so far have yet to impact upon 
people’s day-to-day lives. But future changes will. 
And they won’t be costless. 
Of course, many of these ‘costs’ will take the 
form of new investment, creating jobs and across 
the economy. The Committee on Climate Change 
estimated an extra 1% of GDP per year will need to 
be diverted to investment by 2050. 
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But even then, real ‘net’ costs will still be incurred. 
Being upfront about their scale, timing and who 
they will impact upon (and how any ‘losers’ will be 
compensated in the “just” transition, will be crucial 
in ensuring long-term public support)
Not all of the changes will be popular. 
The Scottish Government has already faced some 
pushback over its reversal for planned cuts to 
Air Passenger Duty (which incidentally was a 
nonsensical policy anyway) and plans to permit 
councils to implement a workplace parking levy (the 
so-called ‘car park tax’). 
But major changes will be necessary. And whilst 
there might – quite rightly – be disagreement over 
individual policy decisions, there is a responsibility 
on politicians of all parties to avoid seeking to make 
short-term political gains at the expense of longer-
term action. 
Building citizen acceptance through political 
leadership and harnessing trusted voices and 
institutions will be crucial. Rapid consumer 
transitions have happened in the past, but require 
effective information sharing and rapid responses to 
public concerns. 
Achieving net zero is not something that is purely 
in the gift of the Scottish Government. Scotland’s 
success in reducing emissions will be heavily 
dependent upon action taken at the UK level, 
particularly in reserved areas linked to industrial 
emissions and in large scale financial support for 
innovation and R&D.  
Whilst it is right that the Scottish Government is 
leading the charge, the onus must be on businesses 
themselves to deliver change. Individual businesses 
and business leaders need to commit to net zero 
carbon and collaborate across their supply chains 
to implement low-carbon technologies at scale and 
pace to drive long-term change. 
Ensuring that existing business that might not 
consider itself as low carbon make the changes 
needed to operate in a low carbon environment will 
not be easy. Whether or not we ultimately end-up 
with a carbon tax will largely depend upon how 
businesses themselves push forward the climate 
change agenda
 
The economic opportunities
But whilst there are challenges, there are also 
significant opportunities.  
Across the globe, an estimated $13.5 trillion of new 
public and private investment in the global energy 
sector alone will be required by 2030. This will 
create jobs and opportunities across our economy. 
It is arguably in this area that most of the hard 
thinking needs to take place – how to secure the 
economic opportunities from Scotland’s climate 
change leadership?
Scotland has major potential in key aspects of the 
low carbon economy, from developing technologies 
to improve the efficiency of renewable energy 
projects through to agriculture and forestry. The 
development of a circular economy through design, 
re-use, re-manufacturing and re-cycling has the 
potential to create new jobs across a range of 
sectors. To achieve this, Scotland can draw upon its 
strong scientific research base and expertise in key 
sectors from energy through to high-value service 
and financial firms.
Scotland’s oil and gas industry will be crucial, both 
in terms of continuing to supply vital energy needs 
for the foreseeable future but at the same time using 
its expertise in key technologies to support the 
transition into new energy systems of the future. 
Past history suggests that this is easier said than 
done. We have not yet created the large-scale 
manufacturing cluster that our renewables figures 
would suggest we should have done. Much of 
the technology and kit for the large onshore and 
offshore windfarms that now exist in Scotland has 
been imported. 
The jobs boom promised as yet to materialise. The 
ongoing challenges around BiFAB are a reflection of 
many of the wider challenges faced by the sector. 
However, there are signs that the government has 
listened. 
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The new Scottish National Investment Bank’s 
primary mission is to ensure transition to net zero, 
with the aim of helping to support the growth of 
low carbon businesses and technologies.  The 
new National Manufacturing Institute of Scotland 
(NMIS) aims to help support a renaissance of 
advanced manufacturing – skills and expertise that 
will be required to support the building of the new 
technologies required.
New developments in offshore wind technologies 
demonstrated in Scotland and the UK will have a 
global market of up to £30 billion per year by 2030.
But as always, the challenge will be balancing these 
more indirect, longer-term investments with short-
term pressures. In a world of tight public sector 
budgets and increased demand in areas such as 
health and social care, money will be scarce.  
At the same time, care is needed to ensure that 
arbitrary annual targets on emissions do not 
create unhelpful incentives. There is a risk of sunk 
investment and businesses struggling to make 
changes in very tight timescales, which might 
ultimately undermine long-term objectives. Careful 
planning and coordination will be key. 
The UK Government’s Industrial Strategy, its 
Clean Growth Strategy and National Productivity 
Investment Fund all have important roles in helping 
to unlock future business opportunities. But here, 
there is a chequered history. The UK’s record on 
supporting new technologies such as carbon 
capture and storage is not great. 
But it is only at the scale of the UK as a whole can 
there be sufficient resource to support increased 
ambition in developing complex and high capital 
cost technologies and systems.
It is inevitable that much greater investment 
from the public sector will be required than is 
currently planned. This is why the concept of 
a ‘Green New Deal’ continues to gain traction. 
Alongside investment, new policies and incentive 
mechanisms will be required to support innovation, 
the deployment of new technologies, the creation 
of new markets and the need for workers with the 
appropriate training and skills to take advantage of 
the global opportunities. 
At the same time, there will need to be greater 
recognition of the complex interactions of different 
policies and investments. 
New frameworks and analytical tools will need to 
be developed to assess the consistency of policy 
approaches and the potential for both positive 
and negative spill-over effects. In recent work, as 
part of the UK Energy Research Centre, we showed 
how economic policy objectives – such as to boost 
productivity or international exports – could actually 
make achieving net zero more difficult. 
Perhaps most of all, the importance of setting out a 
stable long-term environment for investment will be 
the most effective policy that anyone could set. 
It will also require international cooperation, both in 
terms of connectivity, R&D and investment. 
In the current climate both of these elements 
might seem far off, but the sooner stability and 
cooperation returns to our political system the better 
for all of us. 
Fraser of Allander Institute 
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Scotland’s Budget 2019
Tuesday 12th November
We are delighted to announce the Fraser of Allander’s 4th Scotland’s Budget event will take place on 
Thursday 12th November in the National Museum of Scotland in Edinburgh.
This annual briefing event analyses the state of the economy, the public finances and the options 
open to the Scottish Cabinet Secretary for Finance, Economy and Fair Work as the Scottish Govern-
ment prepares for its Budget later in the year.
Alongside the event, we’ll be publishing our annual report of Scotland’s devolved public finances 
and the choices, opportunities and risks facing the Scottish Government as it prepares to set its 
Budget for 2020/21.
Keynote speakers include:
     ■  Paul Johnson, Director, Institute for Fiscal Studies
     ■  David Eiser, Head of Fiscal & Budget Analysis, Fraser of Allander 
       Institute
     ■   Caroline Gardner, Auditor General, Audit Scotland 
     ■  Mairi Spowage, Deputy Director, Fraser of Allander 
       Institute
     ■  Charlotte Barbour, Director of taxation, ICAS
     
Date: Tuesday 12th November
Time: 9am-11.30am (registration & refreshments from 8am)
Fraser of Allander Institute 
University of Strathclyde 
199 Cathedral Street
Glasgow G4 0QU    
Scotland, UK 
Telephone: 0141 548 3958 
Email: fraser@strath.ac.uk
Website: www.strath.ac.uk/fraser
Follow us on Twitter via @Strath_FAI
